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The last two chapters have traced the historical and philosophical paths of flexible 
regulation, in order to understand what some of its leading proponents sought, and what 
they assumed, in creating a regulatory model that actively opened itself to other, non-
state forces including the market, non-state standard-setters, and community deliberation. 
By broadening our lens from the four key perspectives described in the last chapter 
toward the flexible regulation scholarship more broadly, we can take the measure of 
flexible regulation scholarship primarily as it existed at the time of the financial crisis, 
with a view to understanding its theoretical assumptions and underpinnings, its reliance 
on market-based assumptions, its relationship to the notion of innovation, and its 
continued relevance.  
In the context of its time, flexible regulation could be understood in part as an effort to 
find a way forward for the state, in the straitened circumstances of globalization, 
manufactured risk and uncertainty, the rise of neo-conservatism, and the shattering 
effects of post-structuralism. Scholars learned to focus on what could be achieved 
through smarter and more effective regulation and through a reorientation from 
regulation to the broader field of governance, meaning the study of “order and disorder, 
efficiency and legitimacy all in the context of the hybridization of modes of control that 
allow the production of fragmented and multidimensional order within the state, by the 
state, without the state, and beyond the state.”1 In politics but in scholarship too, the 
1990s and early 2000s were marked by considerable hope that it might be possible to 
transcend old-style, left/right political stalemates. If, following Foucault, all human 
interaction bears the marks of power and regulation, then focusing on beyond-state 
factors in particular opens up whole new possibilities for transformative change. 
Different branches of flexible regulation are more or less pragmatic, more or less 
explicitly committed to particular normative objectives, and more or less willing to 
                                                
1 David Levi-Faur, ‘ “Big government” to “big governance”?’ in David Levi-Faur (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 3. 
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embrace the idea of means-end reflexivity – that is, the notion that one’s practical 
experience as a regulator should deeply influence one’s own regulatory goals, as well as 
strategies. Within the varied scholarship on innovation and regulation, at least three 
distinct subject matter threads are also apparent: environmental law, financial regulation 
and corporate governance, and administrative law. Each takes a particular perspective on 
innovation and its relationship to regulation, and each contains varying and even contrary 
positions. As a philosophical project, flexible regulation can also be more or less 
theoretically driven, and more or less pragmatic. What we see, in some of these models, 
are the after-effects of post-structuralism and critical legal theory and a program for 
moving past them through democratic deliberation, even while accepting the contingency 
and contestability of any particular set of policy prescriptions.2  
Yet flexible regulation scholarship is not agnostic. The scholars whose work we are 
considering here are overwhelmingly concerned with what, in the United States and 
Canada at least, would be understood as politically progressive, justice-oriented, equality-
seeking priorities: they want to use the new methods in order to advance more effective 
environmental regulation, including mitigating climate change; better workplace safety 
and employment discrimination; a more accountable and responsive state; more effective 
and more democratic oversight of financial actors; and the like. Benefit to private parties 
or the search for a more efficient market are not these scholars’ concerns. While the 
environmental, finance, and administrative law scholarship is distinct, none of these 
subject matter areas globally takes the un-nuanced position that innovation is beneficial 
by definition. 
The discussion below is based on a review of the 198 US law review articles that were 
the most influential within the flexible regulation field between 1980 and 2012, and 
which also discussed the topic of innovation.3 This literature is still consequential today, 
as well as being historically interesting, because flexible regulation principles and 
methods continue to structure large swaths of contemporary regulation across Anglo-
                                                
2 Experimentalism is one approach that is philosophically located within the pragmatic 
philosophical tradition, which for Dorf and Sabel assumes 
[An] account of thought and action as problem solving in a world, familiar to our time, 
that is bereft of first principles and beset by unintended consequences, ambiguity, and 
difference. Thus, a central theme ... is the reciprocal determination of means and ends: ... 
the objectives presumed in the guiding understandings of theories, strategies, or ideals of 
justice are transformed in the light of the experience of their pursuit, and these 
transformations in turn redefine what counts as a means to a guiding end. Pragmatism 
thus takes the pervasiveness of unintended consequences, understood most generally as 
the impossibility of defining first principles that survive the effort to realize them, as a 
constitutive feature of thought and action, and not as an unfortunate incident of modern 
political life. 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, ‘A constitution of democratic experimentalism’ (1998) 98 
Colum L Rev 267–473. 
3 See Appendix 1, Methodology for more information. The qualitative coding questions are 
contained in Appendix 2, and more information on the results is contained in Appendix 3. This 
book chapter covers only a few of the findings that emerge from the qualitative study and the 
cluster analysis performed.  
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American jurisdictions (and beyond). This literature expresses not only where we have 
been, but where we are.  
In the immediate post-crisis years, one concern was that much of flexible regulation, at 
least in finance, would be deemed ineffective and jettisoned in favor of more prescriptive, 
bright-line regimes that sometimes nostalgically and unrealistically seemed to hearken 
back to earlier times. For an observer like me, this raised real concerns about 
effectiveness in responding to the significant challenges that innovation presents for 
regulation. The precise balance between top-down, bright-line rules and more flexible 
standards may not have been struck perfectly (almost certainly was not struck perfectly) 
in the years before the crisis; yet, bright-line prescriptions have well-established 
limitations. More recently, as populist, anti-progressive waves have swept much of the 
Western world, the far greater concern, especially in the United States, is that not only 
post-crisis but a good portion of post-1960 social, economic and environmental 
regulation could be rolled back. 
Charting a path forward, especially for progressive priorities, in this era of great 
uncertainty requires that we take the measure of where we are, including both how 
technically reasonable and how normatively defensible our choices have been. 
An empirical review of the flexible regulation scholarship, 1980 - 2012  
The flexible regulation literature grew through the period of study, with the majority of 
articles published after about 1997. Table 4.1 below characterizes the articles by primary 
subject matter. 
 
Table 4.1 Primary subject matter of articles  
Within this sample group, environmental articles formed the largest group of articles by 
subject matter. Financial regulation and corporate governance articles were the second 
Primary Subject Matter Frequency (out of 198 articles) 
Environment 80 (40%) 
Finance/corporate governance 45 (23%) 
Other (henceforth “Administrative law”) 41 (21%) 
Science/technology/medicine/intellectual property (IP) 21 (11%) 
Labor or occupational health and/or safety 6 (3%) 
Other social services 3 (2%) 
Education 2 (1%) 
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largest group. Forty-one articles were identified as having an “other” subject matter and 
made up the third-largest group. Most of these “others” concern “big-picture” subject 
matters such as governance, administrative law, government relations, legal theory, and 
the like; a smaller subset reference specific subject matter areas. Given the shared 
concerns with administrative law, public law, and governance in this group, it is 
shorthanded as “administrative law” for the rest of this chapter.4 
Figure 4.1 below displays the number of articles in the sample that were published in 
each calendar year since 1985, when the earliest articles in the sample were published.5 It 
shows that the vast majority of the most influential scholarship was published after 
around 1997. After 2002, the volume of publications remained relatively steady.6 The 
graph also disaggregates the distribution of environmental, financial and corporate 
governance, and administrative law articles. Environmental law articles were the first to 
rise in number, around 1995, and output remained high and relatively stable from the late 
1990s onward. Administrative Law articles began to rise around 2000, but numbers 
dropped off relative to the other categories around 2008. The number of financial and 
corporate governance articles rose slowly and steadily from the late 1990s forward, 
numerically surpassing the administrative law articles around 2006. 
                                                
4 The breakdown is: administrative law (12 articles); governance, including local and 
transnational (8); legal and constitutional theory (7); general policy (5); government relations (4); 
government agencies (3); civil rights and antipoverty initiatives (2). 
5 All three first articles were published in the Stanford Law Review. They were Howard Latin, 
‘Ideal versus real regulatory efficiency: implementation of uniform standards and ‘fine-tuning’ 
regulatory reforms’ (1985) 37 Stan L Rev 1267-332; Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, 
‘Reforming environmental law’ (1985) 37 Stan L Rev 1333-65 (commenting on the Latin article); 
and Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Interest groups in American public law’ (1985) 38 Stan L Rev 29-87. 
6 The relatively small number of articles published after 2010 likely reflects the timing of data 
collection rather than a dearth of publications during that year. In calculating frequency of an 
article’s citation, to even the playing field between older and newer articles, I counted only 
citations within five years of when an article was published. Since there is no way to know 
authoritatively which more recent articles will become the most heavily cited, however, there is a 
limit to the ability to compensate for the passage of time.  
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Figure 4.1 The frequency of articles across time. The trend lines depict the three-year moving average. 
Looking at the relationship between innovation and regulation that this project has sought 
to unearth, the literature displays a remarkable and, in retrospect, predictable consistency: 
regulation scholars are interested in regulation. That is, the vast majority (91%) of the 
articles in the sample, deal with regulatory innovations – not innovations in and by the 
private sector actors operating in those sectors. This result reflects the primary concerns, 
law and regulation, of the scholars whose work was captured.7 It is a forceful reminder of 
the scholarly community operating here: these scholars are examining regulatory 
                                                
7 It also reflects the search terms used to create the database. Names of specific private sector 
innovations (e.g., financial innovations like CDOs, ABSs, etc.; or other specific innovations 
including new pollution mitigation technologies, new nanotechnologies, GMOs or genetic 
modification in health care regulation, and any number of other important innovations) were not 
used as search terms. Including the names of all potential innovations would have been 
practically unworkable, and would not have helped illuminate the relationship between flexible 
regulation and innovation that this book is concerned with. Note, however, that notwithstanding 
that no specific innovations were included in search terms, the financial innovation articles still 
discussed specific underlying private sector innovations in a way that other articles from 
environmental or health regulation, for example, did not. 
Notably, of the 9% of articles coded as “private sector innovations”, not regulatory innovations, 
most still have a strong regulatory overlay. The difference is that they focus on private sector 
innovations first, with regulatory implications second, rather than focusing primarily on 
regulatory innovations as the other 91% of articles do, sometimes with private sector innovations 
of secondary interest. For example, the three most-cited of these 18 private innovation-focused 
articles, with fifteen or more cites each, are Wendy E. Wagner, ‘The triumph of technology based 
standards’ (2000) U Ill L Rev 83-114; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘Innovations in environmental 
policy: The psychology of global climate change’ (2000) U Ill L Rev 299-319; and Susan Sturm, 
‘Second generation employment discrimination: a structural approach’ (2001) 101 Colum L Rev 
458-568. Of the 18 articles, only two discuss private law (commercial or contract law) as 
functional alternatives to regulation; all the rest discuss private sector innovation as it relates to or 
interacts with formal regulatory regimes. Those two articles are omitted from Table 4.2 below, 
but the other 16 are included as relevant. 
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innovations and considering proposals for and the application of new regulatory forms. 
Private innovation, and the question of whether it is beneficial or not, is simply not their 
central concern.  
Therefore, if a positive view about private sector innovation was operating in this 
literature, it could not have been because private sector innovation was a direct object of 
study. It would have had to be operating at the level of background assumptions about 
what kinds of regulatory innovations were beneficial, and why. 
How is flexible regulation meant to be better? 
The new governance and experimentalist work helps to highlight just how far the 
scholarship had moved, by the 2000s, toward a regulatory model that embraced change, 
including human-generated innovation, and was designed to respond to the attendant 
contingency and uncertainty. The point is not that this scholarship directly influenced 
regulatory strategy most of the time, though it may have influenced it in indirect ways. 
The point is that flexible regulatory approaches, including most recently the new 
governance approaches, are of a piece with their disintermediated, heterogeneously 
populated, (aspirationally) deliberative, and “disruptive” times, and alive to the 
regulatory challenges, including the increasing contingency, variability, and dynamism 
that characterized many regulated spaces.  
A post-crisis observer could be concerned that a flexible regulator using these methods 
could become so fractured in its approach, with all this variability and contingency in 
methods and standards, that it loses sight of its regulatory goals, and the public interest, 
altogether. So what exactly is the point of all this flexibility again? This scholarship 
claims that it is arguing for flexibility, not for its own sake or purely on efficiency 
grounds, but because it will also make regulation more effective. It claims that its 
arguments for flexibility are not in fact arguments for deregulation in disguise. As Table 
4.2 demonstrates, the main reasons that the literature advanced flexibility was as a means 
for improving regulation overall, with regulatory congruence – achieving the regulator’s 
goals – appearing as the primary justification twice as frequently as does making 
regulation less costly, or more efficient. 
 
Why regulatory innovation is “good” relative to what 
came before Frequency 
1. Congruence: the old way was ineffective / didn’t work / 
didn’t “fit / didn't achieve the innovator’s (including 
regulator’s, if regulator is innovating) goals 72 (36%) 
2. Cost: the old way was costly / inefficient 34 (17%) 
3. Flexibility: the old way was inflexible / couldn’t move, 
adapt quickly enough 25 (13%) 
CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE, CHAPTER 4  
(NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FORTHCOMING 2017)  
 7 
4. Transparency & accountability: the old way was 
unaccountable / not transparent / captured  29 (15%) 
5. Fairness: the old way was unfair / undemocratic  15 (8%) 
6. Process: (beyond traditional understandings of 
democratic methods) the old way was not consultative or 
collaborative enough, unrepresentative, dealt with wrong 
communities or didn’t include necessary stakeholders 21 (11%) 
TOTAL (Missing = 2) 196 
 
Table 4.2 Type of justification for flexible regulation in the literature by frequency  
 
Table 4.2 sets out the multiple justifications that underlie flexible regulation’s preference 
for flexibility. After congruence and efficiency, the third most common justification for 
more flexible regulatory structures was to make regulation more transparent and 
accountable; the fourth was to make it more flexible and adaptable (generally appearing 
in articles where the stated worry was that industry practice was moving quickly and the 
regulator needed to be able to respond adequately); the fifth was to enable more 
consultative, collaborative processes; and the sixth was to improve fairness. This suggests 
that at least in terms of the overarching arguments they were making, flexible regulation 
scholars remained heavily concerned with familiar public law values: transparency and 
accountability, process, fairness, and achieving stated regulatory goals. Concerns about 
efficiency are clearly present, but this is not scholarship that emphasized efficiency, cost, 
or market-oriented assessments of return or value at the expense of other regulatory 
values. 
Of course, aspirations are one thing and methods are another. What, then, are the 
mechanisms through which flexible regulation scholarship, in general, sought to achieve 
these aims of congruence, efficiency, transparency and accountability, flexibility, better 
process and greater fairness? 
The regulatory scaffolding and the spaces within it 
One helpful way to describe flexible regulatory approaches is through the metaphor of 
legal “architecture”8. Put another way, we can think of flexible regulation as constructing 
“regulatory scaffolding”.9 The term “scaffolding” evokes an image of public actors or 
regulators establishing the overarching boundaries, foundations and institutional framing 
of a regulated space, while intentionally leaving pre-defined, framed-out spaces open. 
                                                
8 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, ‘The architecture of inclusion: advancing workplace equity in higher 
education’ (2006) 29 Harv JL & Gender 247, at 249-334. 
9 Another, more organic metaphor that evokes a somewhat different image – of neither private 
nor public forces setting the parameters for the other – is the “braiding” of public and private 
governance regimes. Ronald Gilson et al., ‘Contracting for innovation: vertical disintegration and 
interfirm collaboration’ (2009) 109 Colum L Rev 431-502, at 489. 
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The key to understanding flexible regulation’s approach is that it does not aim to delimit 
exhaustively every contour or detail of the regulatory regime. It aims to be permeable – to 
change coming from outside the regulatory structure and to the impact of other non-legal 
forces, such as markets and community norms. At the same time, it is an intentionally 
designed structure. It is more than an inert casing, like a balloon, for whatever fills it out. 
Each of the four perspectives described in the last chapter adopts some form of 
scaffolding approach. 
What does this mean? Recall how the classic Welfare State established a built regulatory 
environment characterized by bright-line requirements that set out and then 
comprehensively regulated the four corners of an industry. In the United States for 
example, whether for the regulation of common carriers (rails, trucks, telephone 
companies) under the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, or for banks under the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933, the Welfare State established the scope of an industry (separating 
one common carrier’s coverage from another, or commercial banking from securities); 
set top-down, universal standards for it (up to and including rate-setting and interest rate 
controls); and monitored industry’s implementation of and compliance with those rules.10 
Sanctions for non-compliance were laid out in rule-based terms. The Welfare State and 
the regulatory state overlapped in time and share many common features – they are not 
watertight compartments – but it is nevertheless descriptively accurate to say that Welfare 
State regulation especially was characterized by floors, ceilings, boundaries, and (at least 
on paper) immovable requirements. 
Understanding regulation as open, meta-level scaffolding provokes a shift in regulatory 
approach at every stage of that regulatory project.11 For example, when a scaffolding 
approach is used around regulatory standard-setting, it manifests as a shift from a bright-
line approach to one that can incorporate changing technical knowledge within industry. 
In environmental emissions regulation, then, the standards would change from a static 
                                                
10 Note that the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, along with separating commercial banking from 
securities, also prohibited banks from paying interest on demand deposits and imposed interest 
rate ceilings on other kinds of depository accounts. US federal law also prohibited federal banks 
from engaging in other lines of business including real estate ownership and insurance 
underwriting: R. Alton Gilbert, ‘Requiem for Regulation Q: What it did and why it passed away’, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, February 1986, available at 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/86/02/Requiem_Feb1986.pdf; Saule T. 
Omarova, ‘The quiet metamorphosis: how derivatives changed the “business of banking”’(2009) 
63 U Miami L Rev 1041-109, at 1049-50. 
11 The stages blur, overlap with and inform each other. As noted in this book’s introduction, 
regulation is often described as requiring three fundamental things: some capacity for standard-
setting, some capacity for information-gathering, and some capacity for behavior modification. 
Literature identifying “stages of regulation” is relatively sparse but see Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, ‘The governance triangle: regulatory standards institutions and the shadow of the 
law, in Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods (eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 44, 46 (identifying five stages of regulatory activity: (1) 
agenda-setting, (2) negotiation of standards, (3) implementation, (4) monitoring, and (5) 
enforcement). In most flexible regulation scholarship, as in (non-captured) regulation generally, 
the initial agenda-setting stage remains with the state.  
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limit of parts-per-million of effluent to a standard based on the “best available 
technology” – a more dynamic and iterative placeholder. 12  In that case, new 
improvements in environmental technology would set an evolving standard against which 
industry actors’ performance could be measured. (Less successfully, the same instinct 
underlay other decisions, like that under the Basel II capital adequacy standards discussed 
earlier, to allow designated financial institutions to use their own proprietary risk analytic 
systems to determine how much capital they needed to keep on hand.)  
Ayres’s and Braithwaite’s Responsive Regulation presents another version of the shift 
from two-dimensional “floors and ceilings” toward three-dimensional regulatory 
scaffolding (and Smart Regulation builds in even more dimensionality). 13  At the 
monitoring and implementation stages, for example, as interactions move up and down 
the regulatory and enforcement pyramids, responsive regulatory approaches give 
regulators and enforcement staffers a more structured, yet still customizable set of 
decision-making tools than a non-negotiable, statutorily defined, centrally enforced 
bright-line floors-and-ceilings approach could provide. Flexible regulation – in 
responsive regulation, meaning the enforcement and regulatory pyramids based on tit-for-
tat interaction – frame an iterative decision-making process just as architectural 
scaffolding would frame a building.  
For flexible regulation to function effectively on its own terms, its initial underlying 
design principles should be generally correct, and then it must be capable of being 
modified and improved based on experience. In any environment, certain actions – 
criminal conduct, for example – must still be prohibited outright. Not everything will be 
amenable to modification, and part of the challenge is to identify where flexibility will be 
useful and where it will not.14 Reflexive law and experimentalism in particular erect the 
firmest bits of their scaffolding around ensuring that duly democratic, deliberative, 
procedurally fair decision-making occurs within institutions and organizations. Every 
regulatory structure will be a mix of bright-line, top-down, rule-based requirements and 
                                                
12 Andrew Flynn & Robert Baylis, ‘Pollution regulation and ecological modernization: the 
formulation and implementation of best available techniques not entailing excessive costs’ (1996) 
1 Int Plan Stud 311-29 (describing the origins of the term).  
13 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulatory Debate 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Flexible regulation does not reject the use of 
regulatory floors and ceilings. In fact, it may incorporate regulatory ceilings or, more often, floors 
into its regulatory structure. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, ‘Asymmetrical regulation: risk, 
preemption, and the floor/ceiling distinction’ (2007) 82 NYU L Rev.1547-1619; Benjamin K. 
Sovacool, ‘The best of both worlds: environmental federalism and the need for federal action on 
renewable energy and climate change’ (2008) 27 Stan Envl LJ 397-476. 
14 What we see in the literature is that flexibility is more likely to be recommended around areas 
where regulators must be nimble, or where private actors have access to information that 
regulators do not, or where involving private actors in the regulatory process is seen to produce 
important ancillary benefits such as fostering an endogenous “culture of compliance”. Flexibility 
makes less sense where certainty and consistency is more important than perfect congruence, see 
Colin S. Diver, ‘Optimal precision of administrative rules’ (1983) 93 Yale LJ 65-109; Cristie L. 
Ford, ‘Principles-based securities regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis’ (2010) 45 
McGill L Rev 257–307. 
CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE, CHAPTER 4  
(NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FORTHCOMING 2017)  
 10 
more flexible ones. Nevertheless, the leitmotiv animating flexible regulation is the 
conviction that one can build, within the regulatory / administrative space that lies 
between private action and political action, a new kind of decision-making, analytic, or 
jurisdictional architecture that can evolve and respond to information, even while 
reflecting the public interest.  
The very idea of scaffolding regulation also captures the more pluralist notion of 
legitimate authority that characterizes (post)modern conceptions of regulation. Scholars 
and regulators have pinned their hopes not on regulation as a force unto itself, so much as 
on regulation as an effective mechanism for leveraging other forces operating in 
society.15 Those other forces operate “in the shadow of” law or regulation, and the point 
of the regulation is to influence and channel them.16 All the same, the very fact that 
regulation aims to be flexible – to erect scaffolding, not the whole building – implies that 
there must be something, some legitimate force possessing agency, that regulation could 
seek to frame and channel and not just supplant.  
What fills in the spaces in the scaffolding depends on the model, and the choice tells us a 
great deal about how “neoliberal”, “progressive”, or agnostic flexible regulation actually 
turns out to be. Three main forces fill in the regulatory framework, according to different 
groups of scholars: market forces (in various versions, as described below); deliberation 
and community norms; and private industry standards. The three are not totally 
comparable: the first two are processes while the third relates to concrete standards, 
which can be influenced by the first two processes. But what is crucial is the role these 
mechanisms play: they are the prime movers in the account, with direct public regulatory 
intervention operating more “at a distance”.17 
How central were market forces?  
In the current moment, when much of the regulation scholarship of the last thirty years is 
being re-evaluated, this is a pressing question. What kind of regulatory innovations were 
being advanced by the 91% of articles in the sample that dealt with regulatory, as 
opposed to private sector, innovations? Did regulation scholarship privilege market 
forces or market-based evaluation methods over other forces and if so, what were the 
anticipated distributional effects? Why was this regulatory innovation considered by the 
scholar to be “good” relative to what came before? Who were the standard-setters in the 
                                                
15 Lessig describes this leveraging power as a unique feature of law: ‘The new Chicago school’ 
(1998) 27 J Legal Stud 661–91, at 666. 
16 Adrienne Héritier & Dirk Lemkuhl, ‘The shadow of hierarchy and new modes of governance’ 
(2008) 28 J Pub Pol’y 1–17; also Michael P. Vandenbergh, ‘The private life of public law’ (2005) 
105 Colum L Rev 2029-96, at 2030. 
17 Neil Gunningham, ‘Environment law, regulation and governance: shifting architectures’ (2009) 
21 J Envtl L 179-212 at 180–4. Other terms are “indirect regulation” or “regulation by proxy” – 
see Harold Seidman & Robert S. Gilmour, Politics, Position, and Power: From the Positive to the 
Regulatory State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) – or “third party government” – see 
Lester M. Salamon, The Tools of Government: A Guide to New Governance (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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account; that is, who decided whether that “good” was being achieved? And finally, what 
was the evaluation method for determining whether that “good” was being achieved? 
What we see is a split in the strategies that different scholars advocate. Only a small 
minority of the articles advanced straightforward market-based arguments: less than one 
sixteenth deployed pure “market forces” as the primary basis of the regulatory 
innovation.18 On the other hand, about another third of the articles advanced new 
regulatory strategies or structures that nevertheless, in terms of continued public authority 
and agency, maintained a strong and relatively top-down regulatory presence. Within this 
category, slightly more than a fifth of all the regulatory innovation articles in the set 
describe “other” innovations, which were essentially concerned with reallocating 
authority between branches or levels of government.19 These are less relevant to our 
inquiry, in the sense that they are not really flexible regulation proposals. A further one 
eighth of the regulatory innovation articles argued for imposing new mandatory or bright-
line regulatory standards. To a certain degree, the purely market-based articles on one 
side, and the “other” and bright-line mandatory standards articles on the other represent 
polar perspectives, in ideological terms, that we might have recognized before flexible 
regulation: deregulation and market-based programs, versus bright-line rules.  
Of greater interest here, almost half the regulatory innovation articles in the set advanced 
arguments in favor of regulatory innovations that were significantly more porous to and 
cooperative with industry or private actors than traditional regulatory structures were, 
while not being deregulatory. This is perhaps the signal change that the regulatory state 
brings. In those accounts, industry or private actors were often to be motivated using 
engagement, dialogue and incentives rather than traditional sanction-oriented regulatory 
tools. Almost half these articles envision either greater cooperation with private actors, or 
developing incentives-based regimes. On their own, these categories do not explain the 
nature of the cooperation or how heavily those incentives rely on market-based, or other, 
                                                
18 The market-based articles with more than fifteen cites within the database are Troy A. Paredes, 
‘On the decision to regulate hedge funds: the SEC’s regulatory philosophy, style, and mission’ 
(2006) 2006 U Ill L Rev 975-1036; Roberta Romano, ‘Empowering investors: a market approach 
to securities regulation’ (1998) 107 Yale LJ 2359-2430; and James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, 
‘Currencies and the commodification of environmental law’ (2000) 53 Stan L Rev 607-94 (this 
last identifying the limits of environmental trading markets to “value” non-fungible 
environmental assets). 
19 Three quarters of the articles in the “other” category describe regulatory innovations that 
transcend regulatory scales or jurisdiction, or reallocate responsibilities between either levels or 
branches of government. These articles generally have more to do with federalism or allocation of 
authority between existing regulators than they do with regulatory innovations, so they are 
excluded from Figure 5.2 below. E.g., the articles with more than fifteen cites in this category are 
Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, ‘The emergence of global administrative 
law’ (2005) 68 Law & Contemp Probs 15-61 Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, ‘Centralized 
oversight of the regulatory state’ (2006) 106 Colum L Rev 1260-1329; David E. Adelman & 
Kirsten H. Engel, ‘Reorienting state climate change policies to induce technological change’ 
(2008) 50 Ariz L Rev 835-78. One other article in the “other” category has more than fifteen cites 
but is an outlier in terms of topic: it is Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Cognition and cost-benefit analysis’ 
(2000) 29 J Leg Stud 1059-103.  
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structures; however, at a minimum they bring home the degree to which cooperation with 
regulated actors, and the economics-derived rational actor model on whom incentives-
based models rely, underpin close to half the regulatory prescriptions in the set.  
Arguments in favor of new information-forcing standards stand somewhat in the middle 
between old and new, traditional (in its bipolar forms) and regulatory state / cooperative: 
they are mandatory top-down standards that require private actors to disclose information 
(without trying to cooperate or extending a great deal of faith to private actors), on the 
assumption that that information will catalyze non-state forces to respond (thereby 
activating indirect incentives and moving costly enforcement and sanctioning obligations 
out of the hands of the state).20 Dispositionally they straddle the more opposing positions. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the four most popular regulatory innovations over time, not including 
the “other” category. The most frequently advocated or described new regulatory 
methods were those that spanned the so-called public/private divide or were more 
collaborative in some way; followed by, tied with the “other” category, regulatory 
innovations in mandatory standards; then incentives-based regulatory design; and then 
new information-forcing requirements.21 We see that articles advocating mandatory 
standards, incentive-based strategies, and information-forcing regulations have remained 
fairly steady since the mid 1990’s. While numbers are small, arguments in favor of 
mandatory standards rose slowly over the last decade covered here, and information-
forcing regulations probably show a general upward trajectory, while incentive-based 
recommendations have dropped. The strategy of spanning the public/private divide or 
incorporating private players or standards into regulation experienced a dramatic increase 
between about 1995 and 2005, and dropped off sharply thereafter. 
                                                
20 See, e.g., Bradley Karkkainen, ‘Information as environmental regulation: TRI and performance 
benchmarking, precursor to a new paradigm?’ (2001) 89 Geo LJ 257-370; or Daniel C. Esty, 
‘Environmental protection in the information age’ (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 115-211. 
21 The proportions are as follows: “spanning public/private divide in new way, incorporating 
private standards or capacity, collaborating,” n=66, or 37%; “other” as discussed above, and “new 
mandatory standards or top-down strategy – e.g., ex ante licensing, bright-line rules or 
certification requirements”, each n=28, or 16%; “incentive-based regulatory design to align 
private actors’ interests with public interests,” n=21, 12%; “new information-forcing 
requirements,” n=20, or 11%; “market forces,” n=11 or 6%; and both “bringing in third parties as 
quasi-official regulatory surrogates e.g., monitors, auditors, certifiers” and “bringing in civil 
society or community e.g., name-and-shame or awards for industry leaders” at n=3 each, or 2% 
each. 
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Figure 4.2 The frequency of articles for the four most popular regulatory innovations advocated across time. The lines 
depict the three-year moving average. 
 
What was the regulatory innovation trying to achieve?  
The impression of a split in the scholarship is reinforced if we look at the questions of 
what the primary priorities advanced by the regulatory innovation are meant to be; why 
the scholar considers the regulatory innovation they are advocating or examining to be 
“good” relative to what came before; and who, according to the description in the article, 
decides whether that “good” is being achieved and on what basis. The full account is too 
complex to depict here – more information is contained in Appendix 3 – but in brief, the 
following emerges: first (reflecting the dominance of the environmental law scholarship 
in the set), about one third of the time, the primary good being advanced by the new 
regulatory technology is environmental protection or natural resources conservation. 
National or collective economic benefit is the next most popular “good”, cited in one 
quarter of the articles, and each of “equality, greater human flourishing, public health” 
and “enhanced democracy / citizen engagement / community participation / voice” are 
identified in a further one eighth or so of the articles. This suggests that public values, not 
private gain, continue to be the overwhelming goals of regulation. This should not be 
surprising, but it does put to rest overbroad arguments that regulation scholarship over the 
last three decades has been directly or primarily concerned with private gain, not public 
wellbeing. 
Strong claims that the regulation scholarship was neoliberal in its assessment methods – 
meaning that value was defined primarily in terms of economic performance – also seem 
overstated. As noted above, in terms of why the regulatory innovation is seen as “good” 
relative to what came before, just under a fifth of the articles claimed that the old way 
was inefficient and the new way less costly. By contrast, over a third claimed that the old 
way was ineffective and the new way more likely to produce outcomes congruent with 
regulatory goals. Another fifth of the articles were concerned either with fairness or 
process, on the basis that the old way was unfair, undemocratic, unrepresentative, or 
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insufficiently consultative or collaborative. As well, four fifths of articles still identified 
existing state-based regulators as the standard-setters who had the authority to determine 
whether the good in question was being achieved by the innovation. Articles that would 
place that responsibility with the private sector were a distant second, with just over one 
tenth of the articles. 
It is in the “evaluation method” – that is, the method regulators were meant to use to 
determine whether the regulatory “good” they sought was being achieved – that the data 
become most mixed. When it comes to the evaluation method by which the standard-
setter (overwhelmingly a state regulator) was to determine whether the good in question 
was actually being achieved, almost one third of articles would require the standard-setter 
to check against static, bright-line or rule-based requirements. On the other hand, over a 
quarter would use the efficient market as the evaluation method, on the assumption that 
the best ideas will rise to the top through competition. Next in line was the use of more 
context-specific and/or flexible metrics like formal outcome analysis or performance-
based analysis, at just under a quarter of the articles. Dialogue, deliberation, consultation 
and/or consensus were the evaluation methods in slightly less than one eighth of the 
articles, and self-monitoring and inter-firm comparative analysis in another one sixteenth 
of them. What this may suggest is greater collective confidence about ends – the good 
they were seeking – and the importance of state standard-setting; combined perhaps with 
less conviction about means, and a greater willingness to accept the market as a 
reasonable mechanism for achieving those ends. 
Taken together, what emerges from this analysis is an image of a diverse scholarly 
community that has taken on board, to a significant extent, notions of incentives and 
performance assessment – this is in keeping with what we might expect from our earlier 
description of the rise of the regulatory state, and economics. However, this work cannot 
be described on a comprehensive basis as prioritizing market forces and market 
evaluative methods above other forces or methods. In other words, while the scholarship 
is divided, regulation scholarship across the last three decades has not embraced 
unalloyed market fundamentalism. The flexible regulation scholarship also contains rich 
veins of public-minded, fairness-oriented, and deliberative methods and priorities. 
Does a rising tide lift all boats?  
Also notable is the distributional effect that the articles in question expected to see from 
the innovations they were discussing. A central correlative to neoliberalism has been that 
it privileges a particular, economic definition of worth pursuant to which there will be 
clear winners and losers in a zero-sum game. This turns out not to be the imaginary that 
these articles inhabit, or seek to advance.  
Slightly more than half the articles in the set anticipated that there would be winners and 
losers, and that the innovation in question would provide a competitive advantage for one 
group over another. Interestingly, however, almost three quarters of articles asserting that 
view were writing about finance and financial regulation. This is notable because the 
finance articles are exceptional in sometimes sounding the alarm about the private 
innovation in question, rather than celebrating a regulatory innovation. Several articles 
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presciently identified the risks associated with the private sector innovation, and to some 
degree anticipated problems that gave rise to the financial crisis.22 Among these articles, 
                                                
22 I hesitate to make any quantitative claims about this scholarship given the difficulties in 
extricating private sector from public sector innovations in the literature. However, it is 
noteworthy that several articles in the database were: (a) written before the financial crisis, i.e., 
published in or before 2008, in which (b) privately-sector innovations, (c) in the financial sector 
were (d) thought to create winners and losers and (e) in which the “winners” were the financial 
innovators themselves, sometimes at considerable cost to others, (f) thereby raising concerns 
about the consequences for regulation or the adequacy of the existing regulatory regime. We do 
not see a similarly skepticism about innovation in the other subject areas, environmental and 
administrative law (which tend to be cited more within the database). The articles meeting the 
above criteria are Willa Gibson, ‘Are swap agreements securities or futures?: The inadequacies of 
applying the traditional regulatory approach to OTC derivatives transactions’ (1999) 24 J Corp L 
379-416 and Frank Partnoy, ‘The Siskel and Ebert of financial markets?: Two thumbs down for 
the credit rating agencies’ (1999) 77 Wash U L Q 619-714 (with 9 cites each in the database); and 
with seven cites each: Henry T. C. Hu, ‘Swaps, the modern process of financial innovation and 
the vulnerability of a regulatory paradigm’ (1989) 138 U Pa L Rev 333-435; Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, ‘Accounting for greed: unraveling the rogue trader mystery’ (2000) 79 Oregon L Rev 
301-38; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, ‘A tale of three markets: the law and economics 
of predatory lending’ (2002) 80 Texas L Rev 1255-381; and Arthur E Wilmarth, Jr, ‘The 
transformation of the U.S. financial services industry, 1975-2000: competition, consolidation, and 
increased risks’ (2002) U Ill L Rev 215-476. With six cites: Jerry W. Markham, ‘“Confederate 
bonds,” “General Custer,” and the regulation of derivative financial instruments’ (1994) 25 Seton 
Hall L Rev 1-73. The article in the dataset that was perhaps the most skeptical of innovation and 
the most emphatic about the need for continued forceful, fairly traditional regulation was also on 
the topic of financial regulation: it was Robert A. Prentice, ‘The inevitability of a strong SEC’ 
(2006) 91 Cornell L Rev 775-839 (12 cites). 
In addition, three pre-crisis articles focused on the need for regulatory reforms in response to the 
concerns arising from private sector financial innovation, without focusing to the same degree on 
the private innovation itself. They are William W. Bratton, ‘Does corporate law protect the 
interests of shareholders and other stakeholders? Enron and the dark side of shareholder value’ 
(2002) 76 Tulane L Rev 1275-1361 (24 cites); Thomas Lee Hazen, ‘Disparate regulatory schemes 
for parallel activities: securities regulation, derivatives regulation, gambling, and insurance’ 
(2005) 24 Ann Rev Banking & Fin L 375-441 (9 cites); and Kenneth A. Bamberger, ‘Regulation 
as delegation: private firms, decisionmaking, and accountability in the administrative state’ 
(2006) 56 Duke L J 377-468 (9 cites). On the other hand, one early article recommended a 
regulatory change, integrating the SEC and the CFTC, but for the purpose of further spurring 
financial innovation: Thomas A. Russo & Marlisa Vinciguerra, ‘Financial innovation and 
uncertain regulation: selected issues regarding new product development’ (1991) 69 Texas L Rev 
1431-538 (10 cites).  
At the same time, it is also noteworthy that many of the financial articles in the database 
discussed the importance of increasing regulatory coordination across borders, including several 
articles that emphasized the value of competition between regulators. This latter emphasis was a 
noticeable contrast relative to some other fields (e.g., environmental regulation), where risks 
associated with regulatory arbitrage seem to have been more front-of-mind. Discussing cross-
border regulation are: Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, ‘A blueprint for cross-border access 
to U.S. investors: a new international framework’ (2007) 48 Harv Intl L J 31-68 (23 cites); 
Edward F. Greene, ‘Beyond borders: time to tear down the barriers to global investing’ (2007) 48 
Harv Intl L J 85-97 (response to article by Ethiopis Tafara and Robert J. Peterson above) (10 
CRISTIE FORD, INNOVATION AND THE STATE: FINANCE, REGULATION, AND JUSTICE, CHAPTER 4  
(NEW YORK: CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, FORTHCOMING 2017)  
 16 
the idea that there would be winners and losers associated with an innovation should not 
be interpreted to mean that the author thought that was either good, or inevitable. In many 
cases, the opposite was true.  
Just as interestingly, however, almost half of the articles in the total set argued that there 
would in fact be no losers, and that the rising tide produced by the innovation would lift 
all boats. Almost three quarters of these fell into the administrative law category.23 We 
may be able to interpret the “there will be no losers” analysis in a few different ways, but 
one thing that is clear is that many of these articles were theoretical in nature, and were 
more directed toward envisioning new possibilities for the regulatory state than concrete 
responses to particular regulatory challenges. (Certainly at least in the financial regulation 
context, the claim that everyone will benefit as a result of a new arrangement seems 
harder to sustain now.24 We come back in the next chapter to observe how politically 
attractive simplified everyone-wins accounts sometimes turned out to be). Thus, both 
sides of the distributional analysis – those who argued that there would be winners and 
losers, and those who argued that everyone would benefit – need to be qualified to some 
extent. Neither perspective can be automatically associated with a stronger commitment 
to either neoliberal or egalitarian objectives.  
Financial regulation scholarship as outlier 
The financial regulation scholarship’s significant skepticism about who will benefit from 
new innovations is significant, and makes that literature qualitatively different from what 
we see in the environmental and especially the administrative law realms. The financial 
                                                                                                                                            
cites); and Eric J. Pan, ‘A European solution to the regulation of cross-border markets’ (2007) 2 
Brooklyn J Corp, Fin & Comm L 133-66 (7 cites). On the value of regulatory competition, 
including transnationally, are: Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, ‘The myth of state competition in 
corporate law’ (2002) 55 Stan L Rev 679-749 (13 cites); Christopher Brummer, ‘Stock exchanges 
and the new markets for securities laws’ (2008) 75 Chicago L Rev 1435-91 (11 cites); and 
Roberta Romano, ‘The need for competition in international securities regulation’ (2001) 2 Theor 
Inq L 387-562 (7 cites). 
23 These articles are more heavily cited within the database than the financial regulation articles 
discussed immediately above. Of the articles in the administrative law category which argue that 
on balance the innovation in question (always a regulatory innovation in these articles) has the 
potential to lift all boats, those with more than fifteen cites within the database are Jody Freeman, 
‘Collaborative governance in the administrative state’ (1997) 45 UCLA L Rev 1-98; Jody 
Freeman, ‘The Private Role in Public Governance’ (2000) 75 NYU L Rev 543-675; Sunstein, 
‘Cognition and cost-benefit analysis’, note 19 above; Richard B. Stewart, Administrative law in 
the twenty-first century’ (2003) 78 NYU L Rev 437-60; Daniel C. Esty, ‘Good governance at the 
supranational scale globalizing administrative law’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1490-1562; and Bagley & 
Revesz, ‘Centralized oversight’, note 19 above. Other administrative law scholars expressed more 
concern about making flexible regulation work for all stakeholders – see, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, 
‘Empowering stakeholders limits on collaboration as the basis for flexible regulation’ (2000) 41 
Wm & Mary L Rev 411-501. 
24 To be clear, the article of mine in the dataset, on financial regulation and published in 2008, 
falls in this category: Cristie L. Ford, ‘New governance, compliance, and principles-based 
securities regulation’ (2008) 45 Am Bus LJ 1-60 (29 cites).  
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regulation articles were more heavily skewed towards recognizing winners and losers, 
and toward identifying this as problematic. The financial regulation scholarship is also 
qualitatively different in terms of the primary priorities the regulatory innovation is 
seeking to advance; why the innovation is “good” compared to what came before; and the 
evaluation methods used to determine whether the “good” in question was actually being 
achieved. Given this book’s concern with financial innovation in particular, these are 
salient differences. 
First, in terms of the nature of the innovation for which the scholarship is advocating, 
financial regulation articles are much more likely to advocate for “new mandatory 
standards or top-down strategy – e.g., ex ante licensing, bright-line rules or certification 
requirements”. Almost half of the 24 articles recommending new mandatory standards or 
a new top-down strategy are concerned with securities, banking, or corporate law and 
corporate governance. This is disproportionate. Finance articles are also relatively less 
likely to advocate for “more context specific and/or flexible metrics”. In terms of the 
evaluation method for determining whether the regulatory “good” in question is being 
achieved, as well, almost half the finance-related articles would check against static, 
bright-line, or rule-based requirements. Across the entire set, only about one third would 
do so. At the same time, in what at first looks like a paradox and is discussed further 
below, the finance articles are also more likely than the articles generally to identify the 
efficient market as the method for determining whether the regulatory “good” in question 
is being achieved: more than one third of the finance articles make this recommendation, 
as opposed to just over a quarter for the database as a whole.  
Second, the financial regulation articles differ somewhat in terms of the primary priorities 
that the recommended innovation is trying to achieve, and its arguments for why that 
regulatory innovation is better than what came before it. In terms of the good that the 
proposed innovation is seeking to advance, financial regulation articles tend to be slightly 
more concerned than average about congruence and regulatory effectiveness, and slightly 
more concerned about transparency in regulation, but substantially less concerned about 
improving process by being more collaborative or doing a better job of including 
stakeholders. In terms of its primary priorities, a disproportionate number of financial 
regulation articles – almost three fifths, as opposed to one quarter across the database as a 
whole – identify “national or collective economic benefit” as their primary priority. This 
makes sense, though the proportion is striking. Put another way, more than half of the 48 
articles that identified national or collective economic benefit as their primary priority 
come from the financial regulation topic area. (Environmental protection and/or natural 
resources conservation is the dominant priority in the set as a whole, but for obvious 
reasons is not the main priority within the financial regulation scholarship.) At the same 
time, fully half of the 16 total articles that identified private economic benefit or 
competitiveness as their primary priority are also from the financial regulation topic area. 
This priority is identified in only about a twelfth of the articles across the set, but more 
than a fifth of the articles in financial regulation. Equality and greater human flourishing, 
and enhanced democracy and citizen engagement, scarcely feature in the financial 
regulation literature. 
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While we might anticipate a neat overlap, there is a less than perfect correspondence 
between the ten financial regulation articles that identify private economic benefit or 
competitiveness as the innovation’s primary priority, and the twenty financial regulation 
articles that identify the efficient market as the basis of determining whether the good is 
being achieved. Because the arguments across the articles are nuanced, it is not really 
possible to identify distinct and non-overlapping schools of thought within the finance 
articles, except to identify that a spectrum runs from articles that emphasize the value of 
private benefit and efficient markets; through those that link public benefit and efficient 
markets (though often in complex or critical ways, like some of the prescient articles 
described above that identified the risks associated with the private sector innovation and 
anticipated some of the problems that gave rise to the financial crisis); and onto articles 
that emphasize public benefit and the importance of static, bright-line rules. The fact that 
so few financial regulation articles draw on the deliberative or enforced self-regulatory 
instincts that animate flexible regulation more broadly is also noteworthy. It signals 
perhaps a lost thread in the scholarly tradition, which needs to be picked up once again. 
Finally, another striking difference is the degree to which financial regulation scholarship 
seemed to be concerned with particular, specific innovations rather than with generalized 
phenomena such as climate change or globalization. Among the financial regulation 
articles that were coded as responding to manufactured risk, the breakdown is different 
relative to the dataset as a whole. Two thirds of the environmental regulation articles, and 
almost all the administrative law articles in the dataset are really concerned with 
“background change” – that is, general knock-on effects of human innovation, like 
pollution or climate change or complexity. The distribution within the financial 
regulation articles is quite different: while fully half are also responding to background 
change, more than a third are responding to an identified, specific change in markets or 
the economy, and a further one eighth are responding to a specific new product or 
technology. The prescient, critical articles identified above fall into the latter category. In 
other words, financial regulation articles seem to be more likely to be concerned with the 
particular underlying innovations that produce effects like globalization, with their 
attendant regulatory challenges, and relatively less likely to be responding to those 
generalized effects themselves. 
What relationship between private innovation and regulatory 
innovation?  
For present purposes, this final point may be one of the most illuminating. The clear 
majority of the regulatory innovations discussed in the articles were catalyzed by new 
human-created risks – Giddens’s manufactured risk – which produced regulatory 
problems to which regulatory innovation in turn was seen to be the appropriate response. 
At first blush this suggests that this literature was a direct response to private sector 
innovation, presumably underpinned by a robust and well-informed understanding of 
how innovation and regulation intersect. 
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Catalyst(s) for the innovation Frequency 
1. risk 0 
     1a. longstanding natural risk  2 (1%) 
     1b. new manufactured / human-created risk 129 (65%) 
2. opportunity  2 (1%) 
     2a. for private benefit 13(7%) 
     2b. for public benefit 31 (16%) 
3. necessity  21 (11%) 
TOTAL (Missing = 0) 198 
 
Table 4.3 The frequency of catalysts for innovation in the literature 
However, the prominence of manufactured risk in the coding is actually deceiving. As 
Table 4.4 below shows, two thirds of the articles in the database coded as responding to 
manufactured or human-created risk turned out to be responding to background change or 
the effects of innovation, such as climate change or globalization in general terms, rather 
than to any specific new technology. While these background changes are themselves a 
product of technological innovation(s), the actual technological innovations themselves 
were not the main concern in these accounts. Their concern was effects: climate change, 
pollution, and the like. 25  Only about a third of the articles in the sample, a 
                                                
25 The articles are too many to list here, but articles coded as responding to new manufactured / 
human-created risk, which have more than fifteen cites within the database, are: Cass R. Sunstein, 
‘Administrative substance’ (1991) Duke LJ 607-46; Daniel C. Esty, ‘Revitalizing environmental 
federalism’ (1996) 95 Mich L Rev 570-653; David Driesen, ‘Is emissions trading an economic 
incentive program?: replacing the command and control/economic incentive dichotomy’ (1998) 
55 Wash & Lee L Rev 289-350; Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, ‘The political economy 
of market based environmental policy: the US acid rain program’ (1998) 41 J Law Econ 37-84; 
Rena I. Steinzor, ‘Reinventing environmental regulation: the dangerous journey from command 
to self control’ (1998) 22 Harv Envtl L Rev 103-202; Daniel Farber, ‘Taking slippage seriously: 
noncompliance and creative compliance in environmental law’ (1999) 23 Harv Envtl L Rev 297-
326; Daniel Farber, ‘Triangulating the future of reinvention: three emerging models of 
environmental protection’ (2000) 2000 U Ill L Rev 61-82; Seidenfeld, ‘Empowering 
stakeholders’, note 24 above; Wagner, ‘Technology based standards’, note 7 above; Richard B. 
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disproportionate number of which come from the financial regulation field, dealt with 
risk generated from specific new technologies or products, or specific changes in the 
markets or economy, or in law and policy.  
Type of manufactured/human-created risk Frequency 
1. New product/technology 10 (8%) 
2. Specific change in markets/economy 13 (10%) 
3. Specific change in law/policy 21 (16%) 
4. Background change 85 (66%) 
TOTAL (Missing = 0) 129 
 
Table 4.4: Kinds of manufactured / human-created risks described in the literature 
Moreover, when charted across time, we can see that the one sixth of articles in which 
regulatory innovation was being advocated in order to respond to specific changes in law 
and policy started to grow beginning around 1997, corresponding with the growth of 
environmental articles. Reviewing the articles shows that much of this growth could be 
attributed directly to new environmental policies advanced by the Clinton 
Administration, like Project XL, which was launched in 1995. Since these articles were 
really about a regulatory change in response to a policy change, they still operate at some 
distance from any underlying private sector innovations that might have been taking 
place.26  
                                                                                                                                            
Stewart, ‘A new generation of environmental regulation’ (2001-2002) 29 Cap U L Rev 21-182; 
William W. Buzbee, ‘Recognizing the regulatory commons: a theory of regulatory gaps’ (2003) 
89 Iowa L Rev 1-64; Bradley C. Karkkainen, ‘Adaptive ecosystem management and regulatory 
penalty defaults’ (2003) 87 Minn L Rev 943-98; and Daniel C. Esty, ‘Good governance at the 
supranational scale globalizing administrative law’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1490-562. Two additional 
articles in this category, which go to responding to human-created risk but in quite a different 
way, are Elena Kagan, ‘Presidential administration’ (2001) 114 Harv L Rev 2245-385; and Oren 
Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, ‘Making credit safer’ (2008) 157 U Pa L Rev 1-101.  
26 Of the 21 articles in this category, four are specifically concerned with Project XL. They are 
Dennis D. Hirsch, ‘Bill and Al's XL-ent adventure: an analysis of the EPA's legal authority to 
implement the Clinton Administration's Project XL’ (1998) 129 U Ill L Rev 129-72; Bradford C. 
Mank, ‘The Environmental Protection Agency’s 's Project XL and other regulatory reform 
initiatives: the need for legislative authorization’ (1998) 25 Ecology LQ 1-88; Dennis D. Hirsch, 
‘Project XL and the special case: the EPA's untold success story’ (2001) 26 Colum J Envtl L 219-
58; Shi-Ling Hsu, ‘A game-theoretic approach to regulatory negotiation and a framework for 
empirical analysis’ (2002) 26 Harv Envtl L Rev 33-108. Six other articles, all but one of which 
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This leaves really just one fifth of the articles, which potentially directly address how 
regulation was or should be responding to manufactured risk produced by specific private 
sector innovations. Within these we see a second spurt of articles, responding to new 
products and technology, in the mid-2000s. On inspection, these articles tend to 
correspond to the growth of information and telecommunication technologies during this 
time period (e.g. WiFi, smartphones, etc.), or the greater information available to 
government as a result of the internet and advances in computing.27 We then see the 
                                                                                                                                            
were published between 1999 and 2002, deal with other aspects of EPA regulation including 
toxic risk, the Clean Air Act and cap and trade initiatives (all focused on the policy initiative 
itself, rather than the underlying technology of creating tradable emissions permits). They are 
Howard Latin, ‘Good science, bad regulation, and toxic risk assessment’ (1988) 5 Yale J Reg 89-
148; Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Is the Clean Air Act unconstitutional?’ (1999) 98 Mich L Rev 303-94; 
Rena I. Steinzor, ‘Devolution and the Public Health’ (2000) 24 Harv Envtl L Rev 351-465; 
Bradley Karkkainen, ‘Information as environmental regulation: TRI and performance 
benchmarking, precursor to a new paradigm?’ (2001) 89 Geo LJ 257-370; Byron Swift, ‘How 
environmental laws work: an analysis of the utility sector's response to regulation of nitrogen 
oxides and sulfur dioxide under the Clean Air Act’ (2001) 14 Tul Envtl LJ 309-426; and Cass R. 
Sunstein, ‘The arithmetic of arsenic’ (2002) 90 Geo LJ 2255-310. Two other articles are focused 
on regulatory regimes associated with climate change: they are David M. Driesen, ‘Free lunch or 
cheap fix?: The emissions trading idea and the climate change convention’ (1998) 26 BC Envtl 
Aff L Rev 1-88; and David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, ‘Reorienting state climate change 
policies to induce technological change’ (2008) 50 Ariz L Rev 835-78. 
Of the remaining articles, one is about public housing (Lisa T. Alexander, ‘Stakeholder 
participation in new governance: lessons from Chicago's public housing reform experiment’ 
(2009) 16 Geo J on Poverty L & Pol’y 117-86); one is about financial regulation (Paredes, 
‘Decision to regulate’, note 18 above); and seven are primarily focused on administrative law or 
legal theory. They are: Thomas O. McGarity, ‘Some thoughts on 'deossifying' the rulemaking 
process’ (1992) 41 Duke LJ 1385-462; Robert L. Glicksman & Stephen B. Chapman, ‘Regulatory 
reform and (breach of) the contract with America: improving environmental policy or destroying 
environmental protection?’ (1996) 5 Kan JL & Pub Pol'y 9-46; David L. Markell, ‘The role of 
deterrence-based enforcement in a 'reinvented' state/federal relationship: the divide between 
theory and reality’ (2000) 24 Harv Envtl L Rev 1-114; Jody Freeman, ‘The contracting state’ 
(2000) 28 Fla St UL Rev 155-214; J.B. Ruhl, ‘Regulation by adaptive management - is it 
possible?’ (2005) 7 Minnesota J L, Sci & Tech 21-58; Buzbee, ‘Asymmetrical regulation’, note 
13 above; and David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, ‘New governance & legal regulation: 
complementarity, rivalry, and transformation (Narrowing the gap? law and new approaches to 
governance in the European Union)’ (2007) 13 Colum J Euro L 539-64. 
27 The six articles in this category published between 2003 and 2005 are: Rob Frieden, ‘Adjusting 
the horizontal and vertical in telecommunications regulation: a comparison of the traditional and 
a new layered approach’ (2003) 55 Fed Comm LJ 207-50; Daniel C. Esty, ‘Environmental 
protection in the information age’ (2004) 79 NYU L Rev 115-211; E. Goodman, ‘Spectrum rights 
in the telecoms to come’ (2004) 41 San Diego L Rev 269-404; Beth Simone Noveck, ‘The 
electronic revolution in rulemaking’ (2004) 53 Emory LJ 433-518; R. Alex DuFour, ‘Voice over 
Internet protocol: ending uncertainty and promoting innovation through a regulatory framework’ 
(2005) 13 Comm Law Conspectus 471-508; and Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, ‘Policing 
the spectrum commons’ (2005) 74 Fordham L Rev 663-94. Of the four other articles in the 
category, three concern new financial products or technology and date from well before or well 
after this period. They are: Hu, ‘Swaps’, note 22 above; Gibson, ‘Securities or futures’, note 22 
above; and Erik F. Gerding, ‘Code, crash, and open source: the outsourcing of financial 
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beginnings of the rise in number of articles responding to new changes to the market and 
economy, following the financial crisis in 2008.28  
 
Figure 4.3 The frequency of articles responding to the different categories of human-created or manufactured risk. The 
lines depict the three-year moving average. 
Taken together this suggests that, although human-created or what Giddens calls 
“manufactured” risk was the stated catalyst for regulatory innovation in almost two thirds 
of these articles, almost four fifths of those articles were primarily concerned either with 
responding to the effects of human-created innovation, with which the article did not 
directly concern itself; or with responding to government policy change. In other words, 
notwithstanding its considerable other merits (and with the exception of some of the 
                                                                                                                                            
regulation to risk models and the global financial crisis’ (2009) 84 Wash L Rev 127-291. The 
final article is about nanotechnology: Jordan Paradise et al., ‘Evaluating oversight of human 
drugs and medical devices: a case study of the FDA and Implications for Nanobiotechnology’ 
(2009) 37 J L Med & Ethics 598-624. 
28 The six articles in this category published in 2007 or later Pan, ‘A European solution’, note 22 
above; Steven Schwarcz, ‘Systemic risk’ (2008) 97 Geo LJ 197-250; Jill E. Fisch, ‘Top cop or 
regulatory flop? The SEC at 75’ (2009) 95 Va L Rev 785-823; William K. Sjostrom Jr., ‘The AIG 
bailout’ (2009) 66 Wash & Lee L Rev 943-91; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, 
‘Regulating bankers' pay’ (2010) 98 Geo LJ 247-88; and Charles Whitehead, ‘Reframing 
financial regulation’ (2010) 90 BU L Rev 1-50. Of the others, four deal with the creation and 
operation of emissions trading permits. They are Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, ‘Where 
did all the markets go? An analysis of EPA's emissions trading program’ (1989) 6 Yale J on Reg 
109-53; Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., ‘Pollution trading and environmental injustice: Los 
Angeles' failed experiment in air quality policy’ (1999) 9 Duke Envtl L & Pol'y F 231-90; James 
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, ‘Currencies and the commodification of environmental law’ (2000) 53 Stan 
L Rev 607-94; and Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, ‘Markets and geography: 
designing marketable permit schemes to control local and regional pollutants’ (2001) 28 Ecology 
LQ 569-663. The other three are earlier articles dealing with other financial innovations including 
Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley: they are Jerry W. Markham, ‘Confederate bonds’, note 22 above; 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘What Enron means for the Management and control of the modern business 
corporation: some initial reflections’ (2002) 69 U Chicago L Rev 1233-50; and Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley yawn: heavy rhetoric, light reform (and it just might work)’ 
(2003) 35 Conn L Rev 915-88. 
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financial regulation articles discussed above), the regulation-and-innovation scholarship 
captured here was not focused on thinking about how one might tailor a regulatory 
response to a precisely-defined and well-understood risk, produced by a precisely-defined 
and well-understood private sector innovation.  
Interestingly, the most-cited articles in the database were also qualitatively different from 
the database as a whole, in terms of what catalyzed the regulatory innovation in question. 
Specifically, of the fourteen most-cited articles, only five described themselves as 
responding to human-created manufactured risk.29 Seven others described the regulatory 
innovation in optimistic terms, as responding to opportunity for either public30 or 
private31 benefit. The last two – first and third on the list of most-cited articles in this 
database – described the regulatory innovation in question as responding to necessity.32 
Care should be taken not to give too much emphasis to these distinctions, since the often-
overlapping distinctions between risk and benefit, and public and private in these articles 
sometimes turn on fine semantic distinctions. All the same it may suggest that the most 
influential articles to consider the relationship between innovation and regulation during 
this time period framed the discussion in relatively urgent or optimistic terms, potentially 
lending forward momentum to the conversation while also obscuring the link between 
particular, concretely defined regulatory problems, borne of innovation-related risk, and 
their proposed solutions.  
Flexible regulation and innovation 
In a sense, flexible regulation scholarship considered here, and the different approaches 
within it, reflect our broader social relationship to the idea of innovation as a whole. We 
are happy to celebrate and foster it where we can. We want to believe that innovation has 
the capacity to address some of our most intractable problems. Pro-social innovations, 
like better environmental technology, get a lot of attention. Similarly, in the 
administrative law space, the prospect of transcending entrenched ideological divides and 
                                                
29 The most-cited articles are set out in Appendix 1. These five are Steinzor, ‘Reinventing 
environmental regulation’, note 25 above; Karkkainen, ‘Information as environmental 
regulation’, note 20 above; Stewart, ‘New generation of environmental regulation’, note 25 
above; Buzbee, ‘Asymmetrical regulation’, note 13 above; and Schwarcz, ‘Systemic Risk’, note 
28 above. 
30 Cary Coglianese, ‘Assessing consensus: the promise and performance of negotiated 
rulemaking’ (1997) 46 Duke LJ 1255-349; Freeman, ‘Collaborative governance’, note 23 above; 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, ‘A constitution of democratic experimentalism’ (1998) 98 
Colum L Rev 298–473; Sturm, ‘Second generation employment discrimination’, note 7 above; 
and Kristen Engel, ‘Harnessing the benefits of dynamic federalism in environmental law’ (2006) 
56 Emory LJ 159-90. 
31 Freeman, ‘Private role of public governance’, note 23 above; and Cary Coglianese & David 
Lazer, Management-based regulation: prescribing private management to achieve public goals’ 
(2003) 37 Law & Soc’y Rev 691–730. Each of these articles also claims public benefit in its 
prescriptions; this records their primary emphasis only. 
32 Orly Lobel, ‘The renew deal: the fall of regulation and the rise of governance in contemporary 
legal thought’ (2004) 89 Minn L Rev 342–470; and Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, 
‘Destabilization rights: how public law litigation succeeds’ (2004) 117 Harv L Rev 1015-101. 
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generating a more inclusive, engaged, responsive, and well-tailored public sphere through 
better regulatory technique is deeply appealing. It is primarily only when it comes to 
identifying and responding to specific, antisocial private innovations by powerful actors 
like financial institutions that we are willing to sound the alarm – as if those institutions 
have betrayed something essential about the innovative project, rather than just playing it 
out in a different context. If this literature is any guide (and I think it is), we seem 
unwilling to look carefully at innovation writ large as a potential challenge, perhaps 
because we are unwilling to contemplate the kinds of tradeoffs we sense might be 
involved in doing so.  
Considering innovation itself as a regulatory challenge, one that calls for an informed and 
considered regulatory response, does not require that we reject innovation wholesale. The 
fact that something is a challenge does not mean it must be eliminated. On the contrary, 
flexible regulation scholarship points the way to the kind of flexible, pragmatic, problem-
solving regulatory structure that is capable of engaging with private sector innovation in a 
much more targeted, context-sensitive way. The next step for this scholarship, though, is 
to return to the Turner Review’s allegation and to flip it on its head: to start from the 
premise that innovation is a potential regulatory challenge, almost by definition. The next 
several chapters of this book begin to investigate how innovation, including financial 
innovation, actually develops and evolves. Bright-line rules will have their place in 
responding to the challenge that innovation presents, but we will need access to all the 
tools at our disposal. Abandoning the tools that flexible regulation offers, on the basis of 
some mistaken sense of their equivalence with neoliberalism or market fundamentalism 
or some other pre-crisis wrong turn, would leave us bereft of some of the tools that will 
be most essential to our success. Abandoning the regulatory project under the banner of 
populism, and thereby rejecting the emancipatory, egalitarian instincts that underpin this 
work, would be even worse. 
This scholarship emerged from a particular set of priorities, and it is not exactly fair to 
measure it from a different set of priorities. Nevertheless, from the perspective of 
someone interested in the private sector financial innovations taking place 
simultaneously, the scholarship demonstrates insufficient attention to what private actors 
were doing with the space accorded them within the regulatory scaffolding, including to 
its distributive effects. Some of this is a function of history: flexible regulation emerged 
first and primarily in environmental law, and financial regulation followed. In 
environmental regulation, many private sector pollution control innovations were actually 
generally positive. Articles on more controversial kinds of private sector environmental 
innovations, like fracking or deepwater oil drilling, are scarcely present in this literature. 
In the administrative law articles, as well, much of the literature operates primarily at the 
theoretical or general plane. Its prescriptions can be more exhortative than descriptive. 
The financial regulation articles do relatively better on this measure. Their main 
limitation, based on this sample, seems to be in the absence of thinking about how to 
build in deliberative or public-representative priorities into the regulatory architecture in 
the way that we see elsewhere in the flexible regulation work. In other respects, though, 
the financial regulation articles as a whole still bear the imprints of the regulatory and 
historical flexible regulation conversation of which they are a part.  
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